Voszka Éva könyvek

Kaleidoszkóp - Versenyhelyzet Magyarországon ? 2008?2009

A kötet a Gazdasági Versenyhivatal Versenykultúra Központ támogatásával készült.

Szerkesztette: Laki Mihály?Voszka Éva

Írta: Antalóczy Katalin, Laki Mihály, Pásztor Sára, Sass Magdolna, Szabó Márton, Várhegyi Éva, Voszka Éva

Csatolva olvasható

KALEIDOSZKÓP - Versenyhelyzet Magyarországon 2007-ben

Szerkesztette: Laki Mihály-Voszka Éva

Tartalom

Bevezető (Laki Mihály-Voszka Éva)

  1. Körkép a magyarországi versenyhelyzetről (Laki Mihály-Voszka Éva)
  2. Autópálya-építés és verseny (Csillag István)
  3. Gyógyszerpiaci fejlemények 2007-ben - a gyógyszer-gazdaságossági törvény és a transzparenciaelv hatásai a versenyre (Antalóczy Katalin-Halász György Imre)
  4. A magyar villamosenergia-piac helyzetképe 2008 elején (Szolnoki Pálma-Takácsné Tóth Borbála)
  5. Verseny a felsőoktatásban? Az állami ösztönzés, finanszírozás és irányítás változásainak hatása az egyetemi és főiskolai stratégiákra, a hallgatók orientációjára (Varga Júlia)
  6. Versenyhelyzet és liberalizáció a postai szolgáltatások piacán (Kardos Péter)

Versenyteremtés ? alkuval. Demonopolizáció és állami támogatás az átalakulás idején

A tervgazdaság alapvető jellemzői közé tartozott a vállalatok centralizált szervezeti rendszere és a puha költségvetési korlátot fenntartó állami újraelosztás. Az átalakulástól azt lehetett várni, hogy a magántulajdonnal együtt a verseny is erősödik: felbomlanak a korábban mesterségesen létrehozott nagyvállalatok, csökken a versenytorzító redisztribúció. Ezzel szemben az ezredforduló mindennapjai nálunk is a monopolista praktikák és a nagy fúziók híreitől, az egymásra licitáló újraelosztási tervek és programok, ráadásként az Európai Uniós támogatások ígéreteitől hangosak.
Gyengék maradtak-e valóban Magyarországon a verseny strukturális alapjai? Milyen gazdasági és politikai érdekek tartják fenn a támogatások narkotikumát, milyen erők teszik ciklikus jellegűvé az újraelosztást? Lehet-e tartósan erősíteni a versenyképességet a verseny rovására? A könyv az elméleti keretek és a gazdaságpolitikai dilemmák elemzése mellett apparátusi döntések és vállalati esetek színes palettáját kínálja az Olvasónak, személyes beszélgetéseket és a kortárs történelem levéltárának tekintett napi sajtó cikkeit is felhasználva illeszti össze a sikerek és kódolt kudarcok mozaikjait.

Ownership and Corporate Governance in the Hungarian Large Enterprise Sector

Privatization of the post-socialist economies, including the transfer of state assets to other proprietors, new start ups and green field investments has produced a wide variety of ownership structures in Central and Eastern Europe. One of the main question discussed in recent years concerns the basic characteristics of the post-socialist ownership. Are the new structures peculiar as compared to recent Western market economies, as several researchers argue (Stark 1996, Earle and Estrin 1997, Andreff 1998)? Is the dominant form some kind of recombinant property, i.e. a mixture of state and private ownership, dominated by inter-organizational (corporate) shareholders (Stark 1996, Stark and Kemény 1997)? Or we face a model of managerial capitalism, as Szelényi-Eyal-Townsley (1996) suggest?
This paper analyses the Hungarian case that seems to be rather special in comparison to other post-socialist countries - but not peculiar in comparison to some other market economies. We will argue that the basic features of the ownership structure in big enterprise sector are not dominated by specific institutional solutions. If there are some specific features, they include mainly quantitative aspects (like the concentration of assets, outputs and ownership positions, the predominance of foreign investors) instead of qualitative ones.

In: Corporate Governance in a Changing Economic and Political Environment: Trajectories of Institutional Change, Michal Federowicz, Ruth V. Aguilera eds., Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2003. 170-194.

Privatization as a ?Learning Process?: The Case of Hungary

Hungarian privatization is considered as a process which has been dominated by standard methods. Most of the firms were sold via public tenders, private placement or public offerings and state budget generated significant cash income from selling. A detailed analysis, however shows that the course of privatization has neither been direct nor uniform even in this country. Every conceivable approach occurred on the scene during the last decade, including free distribution to individuals and institutions or preferences to different types of buyers as well as loosely controlled movements and centralized governmental decisions.
The intention of this paper is to show some reasons behind these fluctuations. Privatization is regarded here as a learning process. Learning process not in a technical sense but rather a trial and error approach, an adjustment of all main actors (governments, enterprise management and potential new owners) led partially by constraints, partially by changing opportunities.

In: Successful Transitions, Political Factors of Progress in Post-socialist Countries, Jürgen Beyer, Jan Wielgohs, Helmut Wiesenthal eds., Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2001. 139-152.

Privatization in Central East Europe: can it be designed?

According to general understanding, privatization in Central East Europe does not simply mean the transfer of individual firms from state hands to other proprietors, but it is the precondition and the main instrument of rebuilding the whole economic system. Thus, the task is not to fit in state owned enterprises into a functioning market but to create this new integration mechanism parallel with and by the mean of a wide-ranging change of ownership structure. One of the basic dilemmas of the transformation is, whether it is possible to build up the frameworks of a decentralized market mechanism applying a comprehensive, homogeneous privatization strategy, carried out by centralized governmental institutions. In other words: can privatization be designed?
Based on the Hungarian experience, in comparison with Czech-Slovakia and Poland, this paper will argue that all governments have tried to do so. Nevertheless, their attempts to design ownership changes have been successful at a different degree - not (only) in terms of privatized assets or enterprises but in terms of the impact of programs, guidelines and centralized decision making on the transformation of the proprietary structure. The degree of "design" will be characterized by the stability versus shifts of governmental privatization policies and the relationship between the programs declared and the empirical changes.

In: Institutional Design in New Democracies, A. Lijphart, C.H. Waisman eds., Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1996. 177-194.

Centralization, renationalization, redistribution

(Government's role in changing Hungary's ownership structure)

The paper discusses the shifts in Hungarian privatization strategies and in the role of the government in changing the ownership structure. Analyzing the forms of transformation, the goals and motivations of the participants (enterprises and government organizations) and the reasons for changing the main direction, it argues that the five years history of Hungarian privatization indicates the mixed and unstable character of the process. There has never been a uniform, homogeneous method of changing the ownership structure: market type techniques have been accompanied by central distribution of property.
The often changing governmental strategies, motivated predominantly by purely political considerations, show a clear tendency towards the re-establishment of centralized control of state organizations over the firms. The coming years can see an emergence of redistribution type solutions with highly dubious social and economic implications.

In: Strategic Choice and Path-dependency in Post-socialism, Jerzy Hausner, Bob Jessop, Klaus Nielsen eds., Edward Elgar, Brookfield 1995. pp. 287-308.