(Government's role in changing Hungary's ownership structure)

The paper discusses the shifts in Hungarian privatization strategies and in the role of the government in changing the ownership structure. Analyzing the forms of transformation, the goals and motivations of the participants (enterprises and government organizations) and the reasons for changing the main direction, it argues that the five years history of Hungarian privatization indicates the mixed and unstable character of the process. There has never been a uniform, homogeneous method of changing the ownership structure: market type techniques have been accompanied by central distribution of property.
The often changing governmental strategies, motivated predominantly by purely political considerations, show a clear tendency towards the re-establishment of centralized control of state organizations over the firms. The coming years can see an emergence of redistribution type solutions with highly dubious social and economic implications.

In: Strategic Choice and Path-dependency in Post-socialism, Jerzy Hausner, Bob Jessop, Klaus Nielsen eds., Edward Elgar, Brookfield 1995. pp. 287-308. Tovább»​​​​​​​

Politicians and analysts, businessmen and citizens generally agree that economic transformation should amount to market economy creation. Paradoxically enough, the gradual establishment of the basic institutions of the market, including private ownership, is contrasted by the signs of the reactivation of another integration mechanism, namely the redistribution. Following a temporary withdrawal in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the direct redistributive function of the state seems to have gained new vigor.

Acta Oeconomica, Vol.46.(1994)No.1-2. pp.63-78. Tovább»​​​​​​​

Under planned economy, large state-owned enterprises used to enjoy considerable privileges and protection. They had to keep negotiating with the government for allocations and benefits, but their bargaining position was grounded in their central role in production, exports and employment, and supported by close relations with the administrative bodies of the governing party. The weakening of the old political system in the late 1980s resulted in the shaken position of formerly privileged firms. The threat of a crisis elicited a variety of responses: some enterprises adopted a strategy of wait-and-see, others tried to involve foreign investment, while a third group changed their organizational structure. During 1988 and 1989, more than a hundred enterprises transformed themselves into one or more companies. This process is known in Hungary as "spontaneous privatization."
This paper is one of the case studies of a research project, undertaken by Financial Research Ltd., focusing on transformation into company form as crisis management and its result, namely on the effect of corporate forms on the chances for privatization to succeed. We use the case of Ganz Danubius Ship and Crane Works (GD) to illustrate the alternatives and motivations of the parties concerned, their negotiations, the changes of the positions of shareholders and managers and the role of direct and indirect state control. The sources of information were the former investigations at GD, the study of enterprise documents and numerous interviews with managers and representatives of owners.

Industrial and Environmental Crisis Quarterly, Vol. 8. (1994) No. 1. 23-41. Tovább»​​​​​​​

Restructuring is defined in this paper as a series of specific actions, aimed at the survival of firms and rescue them from liquidation. In this context, categories of direct state actions, corporate actions or actions implemented through intermediaries will be distinguished, according to the level of decisions and sources of financing. Restructuring will be further classified according to methods, such as organizational or financial, and according to timing, such as before, parallel with or after privatization.
Along these dimensions the most critical dilemmas of restructuring can be outlined. The first question is if restructuring can be or should be implemented before privatization or if it should be rather left to the new owners. The second dilemma concerns the question: who should be responsible and pay for restructuring. Is it sure that these measures have to be taken by the state and if yes, which bodies of the state: the government, the state owned lenders, the organizations representing the state as a shareholder, or any specific restructuring departments? Alternatively, is it possible to establish an environment where the SOEs themselves are willing and able to implement the restructuring process?
In Hungary the initial bottom-up approach was replaced first by centrally controlled privatization when restructuring was overshadowed and then by centrally controlled restructuring. Following a brief review of initial conditions, the paper will present the methods according to the different phases of privatization policy, describing the motivations and methods of organizational and financial restructuring. The last section offers a summary of the pros and cons of the different types of restructuring together with some conclusions.

Paper prepared for the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, December 1993 Tovább»​​​​​​​

The Hungarian government introduced several preferential methods in the last years in order to accelerate privatization and to promote the creation of a wide, strong proprietary middle-class. The paper summarizes the empirical experiences with the first and most widespread privatization credit, the so called Existence Loan. It describes the key features and modification of the scheme, the role of the E-loan in the growth of private business and in the privatization process. Thereafter the different types of borrowers and the emerging ownership pattern are reviewed. Finally, the macro and micro economic effects of the E-loan are analyzed, together with the general preconditions supporting or obstructing the use of preferential credit facilities in changing the ownership structure.
The paper argues that some effects of the E-loan are undoubtedly favorable. It has supported the speeding up of privatization as well as the growth of private business through the expansion of existing organizations and especially the emergence of new ones. On the other hand, however, the E-loan scheme is a threat from the point of view of both the companies concerned and the economy as a whole. The problems with the E-loan concern three critical issues: the biased preference of privatization, separating this action from the general economic environment, the credit form of encouraging demand and the risk allocation in the economy.

Paper presented at the workshop "Output decline in Eastern Europe - prospects for recovery?" Laxemburg, November 1993 Tovább»​​​​​​​