Voszka Éva

One basic decision to be made for the distribution of welfare assistance is how to assign the entitlement criteria. This also determines the number of those concerned and thus the extent of community expenditures. These principles are not only manifold in theory; but Hungarian practice also applies various methods in parallel. This study reviews the most important theoretically possible types of approach applied today, primarily on the basis of data supplied by the Hungarian Statistical Office and Tárki. The main task for the analysis is to determine the benefit requirements of how many people (households) should be taken into account when applying certain criteria, i.e. what multiplication factors can be assigned to the various political decisions regulating the macro-economic expenditures, also taking into consideration the advantages and drawbacks of the different approaches.

Esély (Chance) year 17, volume 4, July 2006 pp. 3-20 Tovább»​​​​​​​

The most frequently mentioned element of Union accession, considered by many to be the most important, is the acquisition and distribution of community subsidies. The question is whether the subsidy Hungary receives from the European Union is essentially different from what until now we have called state aid. Will the subsidy received from the Union become a component of domestic redistribution? Initial and as yet incomplete experience suggests that it is a matter of a shift in proportions rather than a sharp turn. Although additional funds flowing into the economy are still slight, the Union subsidy and the co-financing commitment have not replaced the earlier redistribution, but have come along side it to some extent. Redistribution within the economy has therefore probably grown slightly following accession, despite the fact that enterprises only received one third of the structural funds directly, the rest being granted to non-profit organisations and to the state administration in control of distribution. The weight of decisions made by the single state apparatus has not changed, and may even have grown. The system of tenders has not become exclusive at all.

2006. (Éva Voszka) Tovább»​​​​​​​

The idea of concluding privatisation in Hungary first arose in 1997. Since then, two governments have considered the proposals and turned them down. In our estimation, the postponement occurred for short-term political-power reasons rather than for well-grounded economic considerations. Even in this case, however, economic rationality remained undamaged, as a fair number of companies could be still sold during recent years, though at varying rates. At the end of 2004 it did not appear impossible that with a few exceptions the state assets in the competitive sector would soon be acquired by new owners. The principle can thus be confirmed that privatisation is worth declaring completed if it has really been concluded, i.e. when the assets to be sold and able to be sold have been acquired by private companies.

In: Állami vagyon ? privatizáció ?gazdasági rendszerváltozás, ÁPV Rt. (State Assets ? privatisation ? economic transition, State Privatisation and State Holding Company) 2005, Számadás a talentumról sorozat ("Giving account of the talent" series) pp. 16-43 Tovább»​​​​​​​

The Economic Competition Office?s role in shaping market structure

According to economic arguments, the monopolized enterprise structure inherited from the planned economy acts as an obstacle of market competition, so many of the big, artificially created state-owned firms have to be broken up. The state, through the Economic Competition Office as ?guardian? of competition, has to play an active role in this process. The logic is clear, but it was a matter of dispute both theoretically and in practice. The article presents the theoretical dilemmas of demonopolization that appeared during transformation. It shows the attempts to resolve them through competition regulation and the decisions of the Competition Office. The author concludes that the main role in building up competitive market structure was not played by the Competition Office, which declined the task to revise the inherited structure and to oppose several privatization decisions, considering these issues economically and politically sensitive. On the other hand, most mergers and takeovers connected with privatization were simply permitted not in contradiction with the law but sometimes by inconsistent reasoning.

Közgazdasági Szemle ? Economic Review, LI. évf., 2004. January pp.1 - 23. Tovább»​​​​​​​